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In late September 2005, an ordinary newspaper sparked an extraordinary war. The 
Danish Jyllands-Posten dropped not a single bomb—except one sketched into the 
Prophet’s turban. As the New Year arrived, disputes around its twelve Muhammad 
cartoons were still mostly confined to Denmark. But within the month, reprints began to 
emerge in Norway, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Reports soon 
rushed in about ‘anger flashing through the Muslim world.’1 Syrians sacked and burned 
the Danish and Norwegian embassies. Protests in Afghanistan and Somalia claimed 
several lives.2 
 
It was a war about free expression. The Iranian-American scholar Reza Aslan blasted 
the cartoons as ‘fodder for the clash-of-civilizations mentality that pits East against 
West.’3 Yet the British columnist Bruce Anderson railed at ‘soggy liberals’ in the West to 
‘stop cringing’ and ‘stand up for our own values’.4 The French writer Pierre Jourde saw 
some irony. ‘In the West, the most sacred God, the one we dare not touch, is Allah. We 
laugh at Jesus and his father as much as we like.’5 Jourde’s compatriot Régis Debray fired 
back: ‘The lack of historical sensitivity among the hard-and-fast libertarians betrays a 





1 Fisk, 2006. Cf. Bleich, 2011, pp. 3-4.   
2 BBC News, 2006.   
3 Aslan, 2006.   
4 Anderson, 2006.   
5 Jourde, 2006.  
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bearing remains colonial: the world must do as we do, lest it be declared primitive or 
savage.’6 
Predictably pungent were the views of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Born in 1969 in Mogadishu, 
Ali had risen, by the age of 33, to the rank of elected representative to the Dutch 
parliament. She received death threats after writing a screenplay for Theo van Gogh’s 
Submission. The film depicts controversial Koranic verses being projected onto the body 
of a naked woman.7 Ali condemned intellectuals who ‘live off of free speech, but then 
accept censorship.’8 She chided Western cowardice: 
 
In 1980 the British network ITV showed a documentary about the stoning of a 
Saudi Arabian princess who had reportedly committed adultery. When the 
Riyadh government complained, British authorities apologised. We saw the 
same appeasement in 1987 for a sketch about Ayatollah Khomeini. Then, in 
2000, the play Aisha, about the Prophet’s youngest wife, was cancelled even 
before its premiere in Rotterdam. […] Since van Gogh’s murder, writers, 
journalists and artists shut their mouths. Everyone is afraid to criticize Islam. 
 
Submission is still not shown in cinemas.9 
 
Meanwhile there are those who would censor insults to their own views, but relish 
the freedom to offend others. Sir Iqbal Sacranie, then Secretary General of the Muslim 
Council of Britain, protested that ‘Muslims respect and love the Prophet as being  
 
 
6 Quoted in Fredet, 2006.   
7 Van Gogh was murdered in Amsterdam in November 2004 by the 26-year-old son of Moroccan 
immigrants. See Burke, 2014.  
8 Quoted in van Walsum, 2006.   
9 Quoted in Traufetter, 2006.  
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dearer to them than their own families.’10 Scarcely a month later, he publicly declared 
that gays are ‘harmful’, ‘immoral’, and ‘spread disease’11. 
 
The Italian politician Roberto Calderoli unbuttoned his suit during a televised 
interview to flaunt a T-shirt picturing a cartoon image of the Prophet.12 A week later 
Pope Benedict XVI warned, ‘To promote peace and understanding among peoples and 
individuals, it is necessary and urgent that religions and religious symbols be 
respected.’13 Within a few months, the Pontiff would nevertheless proclaim: ‘Show me 
just what Muhammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and 
inhuman.’ Not his own words, but those of a 14th century Byzantine emperor. Benedict 
later apologised, but not before damage had been done. ‘The Pope’s aggressive, insolent 
statement,’ proclaimed a Turkish official, ‘appears to reflect both the hatred within him 
towards Islam and a Crusader mentality. He has destroyed peace.’14 
 
 
1.1. Hatred and value pluralism 
 
Many have challenged the ‘sticks and stones’ adage that ‘words can never hurt me’. 
Words, they argue, can hurt as much as physical attacks.15 Racist, sexist, homophobic, 
and similar epithets become, in the words of the American critical race theorist Mari 
Matsuda, ‘weapons to ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade’.16 The African- 
 
10 Quoted in ‘Danish Cartoons Depicting the Prophet Muhammad Abuse Our Freedoms’, 2005.  
 
11 ‘Muslim head says gays “harmful”’, 2006.   
12 Cavalli, 2006.   
13 Accattoli, 2006.   
14 Owen & Erdem, 2006.   
15 See generally, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, 1999, pp. 3-26; Delgado & Stefancic, 2004; Langton, 1993; 
Matsuda et al., 1993.  
16 Matsuda et al., 1993, p. 1.  
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American scholar Charles Lawrence reminds us that ‘[t]he experience of being called 
“nigger,” “spic,” “Jap,” or “kike” is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is 
instantaneous.’17 
 
Two other leading American proponents of hate speech bans, Richard Delgado and 
Jean Stefancic, recall that, as far back as the Bible, we can find ‘the first known 
discussions of hate speech’ in the Western canon. Judeo-Christian Scripture condemns 
‘cursing the deaf, rebuking neighbours, or scorning others.’18 Aristotle reproaches people 
who ‘speak evil’ (κακηγορεῖν).19   The French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy sees the hate 
speaker as acting on an ‘impulse’ that ‘can go so far as to seek the destruction of the 
other.’20 The German scholar Claudia Hoppe recalls the simultaneously deterrent and 
symbolic role of hate speech bans as a necessary response to European history. ‘Millions 
of Jews’, she recalls, ‘were exterminated on grounds of the so-called “race theory”.’ Hate 
speech in the Weimar Republic fed fascism, which then overthrew German democracy 
utterly, leading to history’s worst atrocities: ‘subsequent generations maintain the 









17 Lawrence, 1993, pp 67-68 (emphasis added). Cf. Nancy, 2013, pp 7-8.   
18 Delgado & Stefancic, 2004, p. 1   
19 Nicomachean Ethics 5.2.1129b23, in Aristotle, [4th century BCE] 1984, vol 2, p 1782 (also translated as 
‘reviling’, ‘verbally abusing’, or ‘slandering’). Cf. below, text accompanying Section 4.12, note 175.  
20 Nancy, 2013, pp 7-8.   
21 Hoppe, 1998, pp 2 – 3 (emphasis added). Cf Günther, 2000; Grimm, 2009b, p 561; Kailitz, 2004, pp 11-
12; Pech, 2003, p 160; Suk, 2012; Tsesis, 2002, pp 11-27; Zwagerman, 2009, pp 8-9. Cf. below, text 
accompanying Section 5.7, notes 196-197.  
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Today, almost all nations—the United States being a notorious, oft-criticised 
exception22—impose penalties for some form of expression because of its hateful content. 
Most Western democracies assume what can be called value pluralism. They expect their 
legislatures and courts to limit the democratic freedoms of some citizens in order to 
safeguard the interests of other citizens.23 
 
Limiting democracy in order to strengthen it is nothing new. Consider our familiar 
doctrines of separations of powers24 and of constitutional checks and balances. They are 
designed in part, as hate speech bans are designed, with the goal of protecting the 
vulnerable. No modern democracy, for example, could legitimately hold an election on 
whether an individual criminal suspect ought to be found guilty. We fear that an innocent 
suspect could perish under the ‘tyranny of the majority’.25 Of course, courts are as 
vulnerable to prejudice as are electoral majorities. Still, we want courts, not voters, to 
render such judgments. We de-democratise that element of democracy in order to protect 
the very citizens who constitute the democracy. 
 
Modern democracies’ regimes of higher-order rights26 equally serve as limits on 
democracy aimed at protecting democracy. An individual right of free expression protects 
unpopular speakers—political dissidents, social critics—from popular hostilities. 
 
 
22 See, e.g., Boyle, 2001; Matsuda, 1993, pp. 26-31; Molnar, 2015; Richards, 1999, pp 2-6, 30-33, 161-
80; Stefancic & Delgado, 1992–93; Waldron, 2012a, pp. 1-6.  
23 On non-citizens, see below, 4.11, text accompanying note 169.   
24 Cf., e.g., Kelsen, 1920, p. 20.   
25 De la démocratie en Amérique, I:7, in de Tocqueville, [1835] 1999, pp. 348-51; On Liberty, ch. 1, in 
Mill, [1869] 1991a, p. 8.  
26 Higher-order rights can claim both de jure and de facto existence. Some weaker democracies formally adopt 
higher-order rights, e.g., in their constitutions, or by statute or treaty, but then largely disregard them. Others, such 
as Britain, may maintain strong doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty, unbound by higher law, yet can be said to 
observe higher-order rights de facto on par with other democracies.  
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For most democracies today27, however, the right is curbed against citizens who spread 
hatred. That limit, too, aims to keep society fair for all citizens. ‘[A]s a matter of 
principle’, observes the European Court of Human Rights, ‘it may be considered 
necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of 
expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance.’ For the 
Court, ‘tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the 
foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society.’28 Sometimes, then, less democracy is 
‘really’ more democracy. According to the British House of Lords member Bhikhu 
Parekh: 
Although free speech is an important value, it is not the only one. Human 
dignity, equality, freedom to live without harassment and intimidation, social 
harmony, mutual respect, and protection of one’s good name and honour are 
also central to the good life and deserve to be safeguarded. Because these 
values conflict, either inherently or in particular contexts, they need to be 
balanced.29 
 
1.2. Rights, security, and citizenship 
 
We face a complicated dialectic. With each step, our reasoning strays ever further 
from democratic foundations. At one remove from democratic processes, the right of 
free expression protects unpopular speakers by limiting the ability of democratic 
 
27 See generally, e.g., Bleich, 2011; Cohen-Almagor, 2005; Josende, 2010 ; Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Noorloos, 
2012; Parekh, 2012; Pech, 2003; Robitaille-Froidure, 2011; Stefancic & Delgado, 1992–93; Thiel, 2003a.   
28 Gündüz v. Turkey, ECHR, no. 35071/97, judgment of 4 December 2003, para. 40; cf. Erbakan v. 
Turkey, ECHR, no. 59405/00, judgment of 6 July 2006, para. 56.  
29 Parekh, 2012, p 43 (emphasis added).  
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legislatures or judges to silence them. The right carves out an exception to the rule of 
democratic processes in order to safeguard democracy itself. At a second remove, 
however, hate speech bans place limits upon those limits. That second step equally aims 
to protect vulnerable citizens, and so to preserve democracy. But then at a third remove, 
those hate speech bans must face limits of their own. Legislatures and courts must 
determine how far they extend. They must therefore place limits on the limits on the 
limits imposed upon democracy. 
I shall challenge the view that free expression within public discourse can 
legitimately be regulated under those prevailing rights regimes. My objection arises not 
from their complexity as such. Human expression is intrinsically complex.30 The wisest 
legal system could never regulate it through a few simple formulas. Moreover, even 
several degrees of removal from some core rule—exceptions to exceptions to 
exceptions—are in themselves nothing unusual in law, as we witness in various tax or 
commercial codes. And of course individual rights do have a role to play in promoting 
free expression.31 
 
Democratic public discourse, however, demands a stronger protection. It must be 
safeguarded not only as an individual right, but as an essential attribute of democratic 
citizenship. It is a perennial mistake to equate the demands imposed upon the state 
through a regime of rights with the demands imposed upon it as a regime of democracy. 
Limits must certainly be placed upon democracy in order to preserve it for all citizens. 
Those limits must themselves be limited, however, when that function encroaches upon 
the elements that make the state a democracy. 
 
30 See below, Sections 2.5 and 5.3.   
31 See below, Section 4.4.  
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Those two strands of law, the strand of individual rights and the strand of democratic 
citizenship, certainly overlap. But they are not identical. Much of our talk about 
democratic citizenship becomes clouded by our talk about individual rights, as if the latter 
subsume the former. Nor is that the only confusion. We further tend to conflate those two 
strands with a third, namely, the strand of state security. Hate speech bans may under 
some circumstances promote the state’s security. Protection of vulnerable persons or 
groups is a standard security concern.32 But bans never promote the state’s democracy. 
This book therefore rejects the positions of Delgado & Stefancic, Lawrence, Matsuda, 
Nancy, and Parekh. In fact, it rejects the views of almost all legislatures, courts, and 
international organisations today. 
 
I am by no means the first to challenge hate speech bans. But most writers wage their 
opposition by claiming the kinds of individual rights or freedoms appearing on our 
familiar checklists of ‘constitutional’, ‘civil’, or ‘human’ rights and freedoms, including 
our numerous bills, charters, and treaties of rights. That view tempts us to view problems 
surrounding expression as self-contained. Self-expression becomes just one of an 
assortment of rights and freedoms on the list. 
 
Free expression is, of course, no more important to individual or collective welfare 
than a number of other interests, such as fair trials, protection from torture, or access to 
food and water. It is, however, the only distinctly democratic interest. A state could easily 
release its political prisoners or stop torturing without becoming a democracy. It might 
well provide food and water without becoming a democracy. It might even offer a 
 
32 Violence against members of a social group most clearly illustrates the state’s concern with hatred as a 
security interest. The modern state is defined, in part, with reference to its monopoly on defining lawful violence 
either by state agents (e.g., military or police) or private agents (e.g., self-defence or defence of an innocent third 
party). Cases in criminal law, for example, are commonly denominated as ‘The State versus’ the defendant. 
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considerable margin of free expression without becoming a democracy. It cannot be a 
democracy, however, without guaranteeing what I shall call the citizen’s prerogative of 
expression within public discourse. Even the right to vote, the more conventional 
hallmark of democracy, is nothing but an occasional, formalised procedure for exercising 
that more basic prerogative. Voting is a mere derivative of speaking.33 
 
We must distinguish carefully among those three strands of law: the strand of 
national security, the strand of individual rights, and the strand of democratic 
citizenship.34 They interweave, but one strand can never wholly blend into another 
without destroying democracy entirely. We fail to regulate expression legitimately until 
we identify the extent to which expression is not just an important right within 
democracy, but is materially constitutive of democracy. 
 
No democracy can be seen as constituted solely through one or a series of legal 
enactments, not even through a comprehensive written ‘constitution’. Written democratic 
constitutions generally confirm the possibility of their own abolition or amendment. And 
that can only mean: through public discourse.35 Through such abolition or amendment 
clauses, democratic constitutions expressly present themselves as constituted through 
nothing but an ongoing process of public discourse. That process had established the 
democracy in the first place, and can at any time re-constitute it. Within a democracy, 
public discourse is the constitution of the constitution. It is the Urverfassung. That 
primordial status of viewpoints expressed, however repulsively, within public discourse 
cannot legitimately lend itself to outright regulation within those democratic legal 
 
33 See below, Section 3.4, text accompanying notes 35 - 36.   
34 See below, Section 4.7, text accompanying note 88.   
35 See below, Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 1 - 5.  
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processes which it constitutes.36 Viewpoint-selective penalties imposed upon expression 
within public discourse can never offer ‘less democracy for the sake of more democracy’. 
They serve only to de-democratise the state, even if they do in some circumstances, like 
certain other de-democratising measures, serve a security interest. 
 
Contrary to widespread opinion, challenges to speech bans in no way assume a value-
neutral state. Such an entity is a conceptual impossibility. Even the most libertarian state 
would by definition promote libertarian values merely through its actions and omissions. 
Through word and deed, the modern democracy proclaims its values every day.37 
 
Serious opponents of bans do not seek a state callous to inequality. They in no way 
expect the state to preach that vulnerable groups ‘should learn to live with’38 hostilities 
and prejudices. To preserve itself as a democracy, a state must certainly take effective 
steps to protect the vulnerable and to promote social and civic pluralism. Such measures 
are indeed legitimately coercive. They include well-established anti-discrimination laws 
extending to commerce, education, and employment. But it is never ‘less democracy for 
the sake of more democracy’ to penalise citizens for expressing within public discourse 
attitudes even grotesquely hostile to those pluralist values. 
 
My challenge to bans on democratic grounds aims to avoid some common 
misunderstandings. One would be the assumption that opposition to bans necessarily 
entails ‘marketplace’, ‘libertarian’, ‘Americanised’, ‘neo-liberal’, or indeed ‘neo-
conservative’ values. Particular points of US free speech law will certainly prove 
invaluable, in view of the degree of detail with which it has been articulated and refined 
 
36 See below, Section 4.3, text accompanying note 43.   
37 See below, Section 4.11.   
38 Waldron, 2012a, p. 3; Waldron, 2012b, p. 331.  
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over many years. That does not mean that those doctrines must be incorporated 
wholesale along with broader political assumptions underlying US legal or political 
culture. US law provides helpful insights into democracy, not exhaustive ones. 
A related misunderstanding concerns the post-World War II model of the European 
social-welfare state. That model, it has been assumed, justifies bans as means of balancing 
the supposedly conflicting values of liberty and equality, often portrayed as a standoff 
between ‘American’ and ‘European’ approaches. The democratic model I shall propose 
will serve to overcome that assumption. It envisages a state that promotes pluralist, anti-
hate worldviews, without having to punish citizens who, within public discourse, crudely 
spurn that ideal. That model will serve to challenge the widespread view that abolition of 
bans is, through a kind of historical determinism, suited only to US law and culture.39 
Pondering democracy’s legitimating conditions may smack of an 18th century 
quaintness. It may seem scarcely suited to the mammoth machines of our post-industrial 
regulatory, administrative, and surveillance states, often managed by anonymous 
bureaucracies, corrupted by commercial influence, and tempted to exaggerate state 
security needs, all the while governing disaffected constituencies.40 What delusions can 
we, in the 21st century, be chasing by seeking yet another holy grail of democratic 
legitimacy? How much democracy is there left to theorise? Does a focus on democracy 
pre-suppose, moreover, an outmoded, Enlightenment-era assumption of perfectly 
rational, autonomous legal subjects? Advocates of bans unsurprisingly depict hate 
 
 
39 See below, Section 6.1.   
40 See, e.g., Crouch, 2004; Nancy, 1990; Nancy, 2013, pp. 4-8; Rancière, 2004; Rancière, 2005, p. 29 
(discussing Baudrillard), pp. 58-60, 80-81; Rorty, 2004. Cf. Post, 1996-97 (discussing Fiss).  
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speech as remedies for the decline of equal citizenship, a decline characteristic of 
atomised and technocratically managed mass societies, which have long drifted from any 
hope of collective endeavour in the ways Rousseau had once imagined. 
 
Democratic theory must certainly take account of our de-democratised spheres.41 We 
must distinguish, however, between the descriptive ‘is’ of observing defects of modern 
democracies, and the normative ‘ought’ of deciding which legal rules and social attitudes 
are best suited to redressing them. Our post-industrial, regulatory and administrative 
societies present dozens of social and technical problems for which democratic theory as 
such has little to offer. But the citizen’s relationship to public discourse is not one of them. 
After centuries of political theory, basic relationships among democracy, freedom, rights, 
and citizenship remain poorly clarified. One of the chances still available to us for 
tempering the dominion of technocratic and managerial spheres is to seize back into our 
hands our societies’ vestiges of citizen-driven democracy.42 Crucial to that aim is insight 





But what about the dangers of hate speech? One problem for many writers has been 
to treat them in political abstraction. That reproach may, in two opposed senses, seem 
odd. From one standpoint, such a reproach seems to underestimate both the problem of 
hate speech and the passionate reactions to it. Hateful expression, after all, inherently 
entails political meanings. Protagonists on all sides often take vibrant political stands. 
From that perspective, it seems strange to suggest that the debate has neglected politics. 
 
41 See below, Section 4.8, text accompanying note 88.   
42 See below, Section 4.1, text accompanying note 20.  
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From an opposite point of view, my reproach seems to overestimate the character of 
hate speech—to attribute to it more politics than it deserves. Jeremy Waldron, for 
example, insists on the materiality of hateful expression. He repeatedly uses metaphors 
drawn from our responses to the physical world. He speaks in naturalist terms about its 
‘slow-acting poison’, which ‘become a disfiguring part of the social environment.’43 
 
That metaphor’s aim is clear. Problems posed by the physical environment, like 
quicksand or bee stings, take on the veneer of objectivity. They retain their harmful 
qualities irrespective of the political contexts in which they arise. The harm of a bee 
sting, and by extension the harm of hate speech, becomes the same in Sweden and in 
Saudi Arabia. That is why Delgado and Stefancic can, in an essentialist vein, trace the 
problem of hate speech, which they see in their own world, back to what they view as a 
sufficiently similar problem within a Biblical community that lived thousands of years 
ago. From that standpoint, removal of the problem from political contingencies, by 
bestowing a fixed, material objectivity upon it, seems justified. Advocates of bans often 
emphasise their quasi-universality. They point to bans embraced across the globe, 
irrespective of differences among political systems.44 
 
I shall agree with the bans’ supporters that hateful expression is experienced in 
painful ways. I disagree, however, that such a harm remains constant in its nature, 
irrespective of the social and political context in which it arises. Unlike the bee sting, 
hateful expression is by no means the same thing in Weimar Germany or 1994 Rwanda 
that it is in early-21st century Western Europe. Certain solutions may be appropriate for 
 
43 Waldron, 2012a, pp. 4, 30, 31, 33, 37, 39, 45, 59, 65-69, 72, 96-97, 116-17; Waldron, 2012b, p. 331. 
Cf., critically, Heinze, 2013b, p. 614.   
44 See above, Section 1.1, text accompanying note 22, and below, Section 3.1. But see also below, Section 
6.1, text accompanying notes 40 - 46.  
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some societies, but not for others. That hypothesis will guide this book’s journey. I shall 
certainly examine the harms attributed to hateful expression, but only towards the end, in 
 
Chapter 5. I shall considerably postpone, then, what many writers ordinarily assume to 
be the foremost questions: Is hate speech harmful? If so, what is to be done about it? 
Unlike the bee sting, we cannot examine the harms attributed to hateful expression ‘as 
such’. We must first examine the political and social contexts in which such expression 
arises. That is the task of Chapters 2 - 4. 
Given what I am claiming to be the constitutive role of public discourse, basic legal 
and political concepts will enter from the outset. Chapter 2 begins with a review of 
some familiar, liberal perspectives on free expression. It also briefly surveys the 
alternative perspectives of republican, communitarian, and critical legal scholars. The 
discussion then pinpoints certain problems arising around such core concepts as 
‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, ‘liberal’, ‘speech’, ‘expression’, ‘content’, ‘viewpoint’, ‘hatred’, 
‘legitimacy’, ‘public discourse’, as well as differences between consequentialist and 
deontological approaches. 
 
Chapter 3 examines certain failures of our dominant, rights-based systems to 
recognise the requirements of democracy. Leading liberals like John Rawls or Ronald 
Dworkin had hailed liberal rights regimes as shields against outright legislative and 
judicial balancing of conflicting social interests. Rights regimes have, however, themselves 
become entrenched within those balancing processes. Regimes of individual or human 
rights may well offer benchmarks for assessing state legitimacy, but in no way provide, 
nor were they historically conceived to provide, criteria of specifically democratic 
legitimacy. We must distinguish between the state’s legitimacy as a state and 
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its legitimacy as a democracy. Whatever anchor free expression may find in rights, we 
must also recognise its distinct grounding in democratic public discourse. We must 
distinguish between a liberal or human right of expression and a democratic citizen 
prerogative of expression. 
 
Supporters of bans often deny that democracies can guarantee any particular safety 
from the harmful effects of speech. They note that atrocities traceable to hate speech arose 
in ‘on paper’ democracies like Germany’s Weimar Republic, Rwanda, or the former 
Yugoslavia. In Chapter 4 it is argued that an historically recent form of democracy has 
emerged since the 1960s. It can be called the ‘longstanding, stable, and prosperous 
democracy’ (LSPD). That model displays internal social and political dynamics which 
equip LSPDs better than non-LSPDs (non-democracies or weaker democracies) to counter 
the risks of hate speech. LSPDs offer more politically legitimate and more practically 
effective ways of preventing the harms of hate speech without having to censor speakers. 
The bans’ defenders rightly note the historical dangers of hate speech. In Chapter 5, 
however, it is argued that their empirical claims, made over decades, have never been 
substantiated for LSPDs. The bans’ advocates alternatively postulate notions of indirect or 
‘symbolic’ causation, that ‘slow acting poison’, whereby hate speech, even if not reliably 
traceable to harmful material effects, nevertheless acts in subtler yet still deleterious ways. 
But such views of indirect causation fail to circumscribe a sphere of harmful speech. They 
render any such delimitation impossible, and any regulation based upon it all the more 
untenable. In view of those difficulties surrounding both direct and indirect causation of 
harm within LSPDs, defenders of bans have also taken ‘dignitarian’, 
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positions. They present hate speech as a malum in se, harmful not through further effects, but 
rather inherently harmful, through its aim to diminish the equal respect and equal citizenship due 
to all members of society. That claim rests, however, on a category error. A metaphorical denial 
of citizenship becomes implausibly equated with a literal, material denial of citizenship. 
 
Chapter 6 locates the LSPD model against the broader backdrop of hate speech 
controversies since the late 20th century. From the very beginnings of global and comparative 
conversations, a ‘US versus the rest of the world’ model has emerged. That dualism styles the 
anti-ban position as aberrantly American, indeed in ways linked to other aberrations of US 
politics and society. It is a misleading dichotomy, however, both in historical and political terms. 
It breeds a historical determinism that oversimplifies the broader approaches, and the character 
of public discourse, not only among democracies, but also between democracies and non-
democracies. The LSPD model offers a more credible lens for distinguishing between those 
democracies which may, and those which may not legitimately maintain bans. The analysis 
concludes, in Chapter 7, with a point-by-point review of common arguments favouring bans, 
and the replies that the LSPD model can offer. 
 
 
